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Reliability Standards for Geomagnetic Disturbances

electric-grid · Federal Energy Regulatory Commission · Published 2013-05-23 · Effective 2013-07-22 · 78 FR 30747

Document

Document number
2013-12141
Federal Register citation
78 FR 30747
CFR reference
18 CFR 40
Type
Rule
Action
Final rule.
Category
electric-grid
Sub-agency
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Publication date
2013-05-23
Effective date
2013-07-22
Energy docket
Docket No. RM12-22-000

Abstract

Under section 215 of the Federal Power Act, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) directs the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization, to submit to the Commission for approval proposed Reliability Standards that address the impact of geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) on the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. The Commission directs NERC to implement the directive in two stages. In the first stage, NERC must submit, within six months of the effective date of this Final Rule, one or more Reliability Standards that require owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System to develop and implement operational procedures to mitigate the effects of GMDs consistent with the reliable operation of the Bulk-Power System. In the second stage, NERC must submit, within 18 months of the effective date of this Final Rule, one or more Reliability Standards that require owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System to conduct initial and on-going assessments of the potential impact of benchmark GMD events on Bulk-Power System equipment and the Bulk-Power System as a whole. The Second Stage GMD Reliability Standards must identify benchmark GMD events that specify what severity GMD events a responsible entity must assess for potential impacts on the Bulk-Power System. If the assessments identify potential impacts from benchmark GMD events, the Reliability Standards should require owners and operators to develop and implement a plan to protect against instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of the Bulk-Power System, caused by damage to critical or vulnerable Bulk-Power System equipment, or otherwise, as a result of a benchmark GMD event. The development of this plan cannot be limited to considering operational procedures or enhanced training alone, but will, subject to the potential impacts of the benchmark GMD events identified in the assessments, contain strategies for pro

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Federal Register document
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