The overarching goal of this project is to lay out a theoretical foundation for the economics of multi-operator spectrum sharing (SS) over both licensed and unlicensed frequency bands considering market uncertainties. Despite intensive efforts to assign more of the electromagnetic spectrum for mobile broadband, it is now widely believed that the traditional exclusive spectrum assignment approach is too limiting to meet the high demands of next-generation (NextG) wireless networks. SS remains critical at all frequency bands, including sub-6 GHz, millimeter-wave bands, and bands in between (7.125 to 24.25 GHz). To usher a new era of SS of licensed and unlicensed bands between (bilateral) and among (multilateral) wireless operators, new sharing models are needed. At their core, these models should incorporate proper incentivization mechanisms, as profit is ultimately the primary factor that motivates operators to share their spectrum. This project focuses on novel privacy-preserving game theoretic models for SS that are particularly suited for exploitation of the short-term spatiotemporal variations in traffic demands between operators. The research agenda is organized into three thrusts. Thrust A: Non-collaborative SS Between Operators. In this thrust, inter-operator SS is investigated in a non-collaborative setting, where operators view each other competitively and do not wish to reveal private information. Several game-theoretic models, including a repeated double-sided Ba