Side-channel attacks are a type of cyber attack where the adversary learns about what is being calculated by observing external properties such as power consumption or electromagnetic emissions. Side-channel information leakage of this type is a potent threat to cryptographic hardware security, arising from the physical effects of computation. These unintentional emissions can be exploited to extract sensitive data, even when cryptographic algorithms are mathematically secure. This project addresses this critical vulnerability by bridging the gap between theoretical models of side-channel leakage and practical hardware design. The novelties of this project include in the development of advanced physical probing models, scalable validation tools, and provably secure design methods. The project's broader significance and importance are in its potential to fundamentally strengthen the physical security of hardware systems used in everyday technologies by making side-channel security verification more systematic, predictable, and accessible. The research team develops new probing models that reflect real-world adversary capabilities and integrates them into advanced computer-aided design tools. These tools analyze various forms of side-channel leakage and determine the level of physical detail needed for accurate predictions. The research team validates the new probing models by designing and fabricating a reconfigurable integrated circuit. This hardware serves as a testbed t